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Diversity in technology competition: the link between platforms and sociotechnical 
transitions 
 
Abstract 
There is an urgent need for a fast transition to a low-carbon economy, which will involve 
behavioural change and new technologies. This paper focuses on the technological dimension of 
the transition. Low-carbon technologies usually have a modular architecture that utilize standards 
to enable interfacing of components. These standards contribute to transition inertia. An important 
question addressed in this article is whether maintaining technological diversity can help overcome 
inertia. This requires keeping options open and foregoing returns to scale. It is a trade-off which 
has technological as well as spatial dimensions which are important because different geographical 
areas may provide institutional or other advantages to the emergence of distinct technologies. In 
order to explore this, the platform competition and transitions literature are reviewed, links 
between them are established, and a system dynamics model is developed where multiple new 
technologies compete with an incumbent. It is used to answer two questions: Will a larger portfolio 
accelerate or delay a transition to a new technology, and under which conditions will such an 
acceleration occur? does spatial differentiation matter to the outcome? The model results show 
that technological diversity and spatial differentiation matter for the speed of transitions. The 
challenge is to create a level competitive field for all technologies accounting for the distinct 
institutional advantages their spatial differentiation may provide. This opens a range of future 
research directions. 
 
Highlights: 
- I develop a model of technology evolution 
- It describes competition of incumbent and new technologies 
- It represents technological diversity and spatial differentiation 
- It studies time to realize a full transition to new technologies 
- Transition time increases with the number of technologies, and spatial dispersion 
 
Keywords: 
Socio-technical transition, niche heterogeneity, platforms, standards, system dynamics 
 
1. Introduction 
Our society needs to make a rapid transition away from the current fossil-fuel dominated 
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economy towards renewable energy sources such as biofuels, solar and wind, and as a result 
considerably increase the energy efficiency of all processes. An effective solution requires 
technical, organizational, economic, institutional, social-cultural and political changes. Such 
pervasive system change is referred to as a socio-technical transition to sustainability [1–3]. For 
example, the electrification of the transport sector is one of several solutions put forward to address 
the issues associated with growth in travel demand, and the associated greenhouse gas emissions 
and oil demand at a global scale [4,5]. 
Transitions initiate when new technologies and related practices are introduced and improved, 
rendering them sufficiently competitive to compete with incumbent technologies [6,7]. New 
technologies may arise in different socio-technical systems and then speciate from one niche-
domain of application to another, thus increasing the variety of competing technologies [3,8]. 
Spatial considerations are relevant as supporting actor networks arise in particular geographical 
locales where often specific or even unique conditions apply [9,10]. 
New technologies introduced in a system have a higher chance of succeeding in protected 
niches because they enable learning and network development [11,12]. This allows the exploration 
of several technological trajectories or promising options in parallel [11]. The example from the 
transport system is the range of hybrid, plug-in hybrid, electric, hydrogen, and biofuel vehicles 
available for public or private transport [13,14]. The increasing number and diversity of firms 
becoming involved in an emerging new technological trajectory increases technology competition, 
and this in turn stimulates innovation and development [15]. Organizational and technological 
diversity is critical to the emergence and development of new technologies, including renewable 
energy technologies, and large system change [16–20]. 
It is argued that greater technological diversity catalyzes technological development and 
increases the potential for technology recombination [21]. Diversity can break the lock-in of 
established technologies. They have a competitive advantage arising from self-reinforcing 
increasing returns to scale which comes from demand and supply factors such as economies of 
scale in production, compatibility with complementary technologies, standardization, learning 
effects, and network externalities [22,23]. Diversity enables higher system ﬂexibility by keeping 
multiple options open, which increases the likelihood of ﬁnding good technical or organizational 
solutions in the face of high uncertainty about long-term economic, political and social conditions 
[24]. However, maintaining diversity comes at the cost of fragmented market shares of 
technologies and low increasing returns to adoption [21]. 
This is where a policy dilemma for socio-technical change arises [7,25]: maintain high 
diversity of new technology solutions in niches, or maintain a lower diversity to rapidly achieve 
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increasing returns to scale. The first option involves supporting a high diversity of expensive but 
promising new technologies in niches. This option facilitates learning and avoids suboptimal 
solutions. The scale-intensive option involves supporting a lower diversity of technologies. This 
option may enable relatively few fast maturing new technologies to compete with, and replace the 
older technologies.  
Wide diversity may hamper scaling up as it fragments resources and impedes rapid innovation 
of the important alternatives. In addition, it increases the uncertainty about candidate technological 
solutions which prevents investors from fully committing to them. Low diversity can lead to an 
early lock-in in a suboptimal technology. Thus, the choice of niche maintaining or scale-intensive 
strategies presents a serious dilemma for policy making.  
The competition between old and new technologies is characterized by two selection 
processes [26]: the replacement of established technologies by emerging ones, and the rivalry 
between alternative new technologies. An illustrative example is the urban transport system. In 
early 20th century, it went through a transition from horse drawn carriages to cars [27]. It involved 
several technologies: bicycles, electric trams, electric cars, gasoline and steam cars. All of them 
competed in separate niches and distinct locales, and against the dominant technology of horse 
drawn carriages.  
In the following decades the current urban transport system will undergo a new transition to 
low-carbon transport modes [28,29]. This transition is used as a motivating case throughout the 
paper and relevant literature is reviewed where appropriate. The transition may involve new 
conceptions of mobility, more sustainable travel patterns, and new forms of spatial planning, and 
new ensembles of low-carbon technologies like electric vehicles (EVs) [30]. The California Zero 
Emissions Vehicle mandate sparked an interest in EVs during the 1990s, and several manufacturers 
developed production models [31]. Its momentum was cut after the court amendment in 2003, but 
it did pave the way for hybrid electric vehicles and other low emission technologies [32].  
At present, the dominant technology is still the internal combustion engine (ICE). A range of 
alternative technologies is developing, and some have entered the market, including plug-in hybrid 
and electric vehicles (EV) [13,14,33–35]. Most established carmakers have developed a range of 
alternative fuel vehicles, along with diversifying firms and startups like Tesla developed higher 
performance cars [14,36]. These technologies are not stand alone products. They are technology 
platforms, i.e. modular technology architectures requiring complementary products and services 
for their operation [37–39].  
This platform architecture raises a number of issues for the transition of the transport system 
[40]: renewable energy integration, EV participation in electricity markets, standardisation of 
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battery types, vehicle to electric grid connection and scheduling technologies, disposal and 
recycling of batteries, and the specifications regarding cables and plugs for recharging. Several 
competing technical standards, for vehicle to grid and vehicle to vehicle interfacing have been 
developed reflecting a local context (US, Europe and Japan) [4,41–43]. Due to different 
institutional advantages that distinct geographical areas offer, it is possible that the diversity of 
existing and future standards and platforms remain locked in niches and do not scale up, resulting 
in a fragmented rather than a winner takes all outcome [44,45].  
The automotive industry is just one industry where technologies have a platform architecture 
[46]. Other technologies have a platform architecture and face challenges of similar nature e.g. 
telecommunications [47], computer software [48], and solar energy [20]. All of these are 
instrumental in implementing cleaner production processes. Thus, it is worth revisiting the 
dilemma stated earlier of diversity versus achieving increasing returns to scale, but from a platform 
competition perspective [38,49].  
Technology competition in niches is an evolutionary process. Therefore, its study requires an 
evolutionary perspective. The present article develops an evolutionary model of technology 
diffusion using system dynamics [50]. The model takes into account spatial differentiation [9,10] 
and technology lifecycle considerations [51] in answering the question: Does the required time to 
transition diminish with a larger number of platform technologies? Moreover, does time diminish 
when different platforms are favoured in different geographical locales? 
Several evolutionary models of technology adoption explore the effect of user preference 
heterogeneity using a variety of modelling approaches [52,53]: diffusion models with increasing 
returns [54–58], co-evolutionary models of users and producers [59–61], and extensions of the 
Nelson and Winter model [62]. Other kinds of modelling approaches have also been applied to 
sociotechnical transitions [63–66]. 
This paper builds upon the work of Loch and Huberman [67] because it offers a useful, 
relatively parsimonious evolutionary model where an incumbent and a new technology compete 
with repeated user choice, externality benefits, and learning by doing technology improvement. 
Their study explores the conditions under which the candidate technology replaces the incumbent. 
In this paper, the model is adapted to a platform setting and extended to increase its realism using: 
(i) a range of competing technologies rather than just one, (ii) spatial differentiation and associated 
unique conditions, and (iii) dynamic performance ceilings for competing technologies to account 
for learning.  
The present paper reviews relevant parts of the sociotechnical transition and platform 
competition literatures, and develops a simulation model with which to address this dilemma. The 
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paper makes three contributions. It clarifies the conceptual link between platforms and technology 
standards, and their relevance for transition research. It explores the dilemmas discussed above 
through the use of a simulation model that combines technology performance competition and 
spatial considerations. It replicates and extends an existing model in the literature. The model is 
used to explore how the number and variety of competing platforms can potentially delay scaling 
up processes, and result in spatially fragmented outcomes.   
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the technology platform literature and 
establishes its relevance for studying transitions to a low-carbon economy. Section 3 presents the 
model. Section 4 discusses simulation results. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Theoretical Basis  
This section provides the conceptual basis upon which the proposed model presented in 
section 3 is based. This is done in three parts. Section 2.1 reviews the link of platforms and 
standards to sociotechnical systems and transitions. This is the starting point for section 2.2 to 
consider sociotechnical niches as places where new platforms develop and compete against 
established platforms. Finally, section 2.3 discusses the five essential factors which influence 
platform competition. These factors are then integrated into a model in section 3.  
 
2.1 A review of the links between platforms, standards and socio-technical transitions 
Technology platforms research spans engineering design and economics perspectives [39]. 
Gawer and Cusumano [68] define platforms as: “products, services, or technologies developed by 
one or more ﬁrms, which serve as foundations upon which a larger number of ﬁrms can build 
further complementary innovations and potentially generate network effects.” In other words, 
platforms are the core of modular technological architectures. Use of such modules in different 
platforms requires the existence of standards i.e. the specifications to which products and processes 
must conform in order to interface with platforms [69]. There are six points of overlap between 
transition research and platforms competition research.  
First, in the Multi-Level Perspective on sociotechnical transitions, standards are part of 
sociotechnical regimes [6,70,71]. Standards enable complementarities between technological 
components, innovations and sub-systems of technological architectures [72]. In this way, they 
contribute to socio-technical system inertia because they reinforce the lock in of particular 
technological architectures or platforms.  
Second, standards being parts of sociotechnical regimes implies that platforms should be 
considered as well because there can be no separate demand for individual components without a 
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core platform system. Thus, a platform is a technological artefact that binds a socio-technical 
system together. Platforms are thus expected to play a fundamental role in contemporary 
transitions and this is one of the many differences with past historical transitions [73–77]. 
For example, automotive and electricity industry actors, along with dedicated standardization 
bodies and developers of charging equipment, coalesced around DC and AC charging solutions 
for EVs [78]. A growing literature on the development of EVs has explored a number of core issues 
[34,79–81]: (i) the basic types of these vehicles and their technical characteristics (fuel economy 
and CO2 emissions), (ii) the advantages and disadvantages of hybrid electric vehicles, plug-in 
electric, and battery vehicles, (iii) vehicle technologies and relevant charging mechanisms, and 
(iv) the beneﬁts and challenges of vehicle to grid technology, ways to overcome them, and the 
interaction with renewable energy sources.  
Third, in the case of platforms and sociotechnical system transitions actor expectations are 
critical. In transitions, niches are places where actors coalesce to develop networks, learn about 
technologies, and articulate their expectations [7,11,82]. Articulation of expectations is also crucial 
in platform competition and can confer a decisive advantage that can lead to platform dominance 
[48,83,84]. The role of expectations has already been explored in the transition to alternative fuel 
vehicles [85,86]. 
Fourth, sociotechnical analyses focus on the role of sociotechnical system incumbents and 
entrants, and how their potential competition or synergies can bring about or stifle a transition 
[3,6,87]. The platform competition literature addresses the same subject under the market entry 
and First Mover Advantage ideas. It aims to see under which conditions incumbents can maintain 
the status quo and FMA under new entrants competition, or whether new entrants can upstage their 
FMA [44,45,88–94]. 
Fifth, business models are part of platform competition research. They are used to explain the 
advantage of early movers but also the success of late entrants [95]. The role of business models 
is also explored in the context of sociotechnical transitions and sustainable innovation. A change 
of business models seems to be fundamental to getting the current sociotechnical systems out of 
their state of lock in [96,97]. There is some obvious middle ground between the two literature 
streams. For example, researching whether business models allow for sustainable system 
innovations, and how does this relate to business success and FMA. 
Sixth, there is some overlap in the research outlook for platforms and socio-technical 
transitions. Platform competition research is shifting towards multi-level platform innovation 
ecosystems [68,98–100]. This multi-level research outlook could well inform the Multi-Level 
Perspective of transition research and vice versa [6]. There is substantial potential for integrating 
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the two literature streams by developing middle-range theories that provide a satisficing trade-off 
between the criteria of good theory: accuracy of representation, generality, and parsimony 
[6,100,101]. 
The discussion above points to the potential for conceptual integration between platform and 
transition research frameworks. A more detailed reviews about platforms, competition strategies, 
and the emerging research agenda  on network effects, leveraging complementor dynamics for 
competitive advantage is provided in [90,102–105]. A complete discussion is beyond the scope of 
this paper. The preceding discussion provides enough motivation to think of niches as places for 
technological 99platform incubation.  
 
2.2 A review of niches as places for platform incubation 
This section reviews niches as places of platform incubation and development, and elaborates 
on core niche processes, incorporating geographic space differentiation as one of their attributes. 
Early on their lifecycle, new technologies are crude, imperfect, and expensive. Niches are 
incubation spaces that provide innovations with some form of active or passive shielding from 
market forces operating in a sociotechnical regime [11,106]. A sociotechnical regime consists of 
groups of interdepended groups of actors each with its own set of rules, the inter-regime alignment 
and coordination of intergroup activities that stabilize sociotechnical trajectories.  
Regime internal and external market niches differ with respect to the low and high level of 
isolation/protection they receive [6]. A market niche is shielded from dominant socio-technical 
regimes through cognitive, social and spatial distances which, taken together, enable distinct 
selection criteria in support of the nascent technology [9,10]. Cognitive distance arises when 
regime actors do not consider the market niche as important for their products, mainly because the 
niche is too small and/or requires specific performance that cannot be served well by the 
technological variants produced within the prevailing socio-technical regime. Social distance can 
also be a part of niche preservation because products might serve specific social groups. Finally, 
spatial distance stems from the niche being located in a geographical locale where very specific 
conditions apply.  
Active shielding might be created through specific interventions by public or private actors 
coming together to support a particular technology platform. Active shielding involves providing 
motives for the take up of particular technologies e.g. the use of alternative fuel vehicles in vehicles 
fleets (taxis, bus, delivery services). In contrast, passive shielding arises without direct actor 
involvement. Geographical locales provide a form of passive shielding where selection pressures 
are strong for contingent rather than strategic reasons and therefore precede any actor mobilisation 
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[11].  
This is illustrated in the emergence of different EV and also in the success of Danish versus 
US wind energy industry [9]. In both cases of active and passive shielding, niche emergence is 
local. Actors are involved in local networks which best suit their interests. Charging standards 
emerged in three distinct geographical regions (United States, Japan, and Europe), but local regime 
rules have led to incompatible designs [42]. An additional factor was that charging standards are 
at the interface between the automotive and the electricity regime [78]. The Danish success story 
is not just a matter of firms and entrepreneurs applying the right strategies but of specific territorial 
institutional advantages e.g. public-private coordination, collaboration practices and informal 
sharing of information [9].  
Niche development helps to articulate new ways of using platforms and actor expectations, 
generate lessons about eco-innovation feasibility, develop and improve alternative platforms, and 
bring together groups of support actors [7,106]. In a market niche, technologies are repeatedly 
tested, modified, refined and adapted to market demands [25]. The speed, with which each 
experiment goes through its lifecycle, depends on the available market niche resources, and on the 
nature of the learning and networking processes among actors that support the technology [7,107]. 
Niche development has a higher chance of success when protection and experimentation is 
used to explore several technological trajectories or promising options in parallel [11]. Diversity 
is a way to stimulate innovation, permitting a broader set of alternative technology recombination 
paths [21]. In the case of the energy sector, supporting diversity is important in innovation for a 
transition to self-sustaining systems [25].  
 
2.3 A review of factors influencing platform market competition  
This section discusses five important factors that influence platform competition: technology 
learning, technological performance, supply and demand increasing returns to scale, commitment, 
rate of technology change [37,39,68,88,108–110]. The development of the model draws on this 
platform competition literature as discussed in section 3. 
 
Factor 1: Technology Learning  
Technology learning supports the process by which firm knowledge about action–outcome 
relationships and the effects of the environment on these relationships is developed [111,112]. The 
extent to which firms can acquire new knowledge depends on their absorptive capacity [113]. 
Absorptive capacity refers to both technological knowledge that supports the ability to generate 
technological breakthroughs, and market pioneering knowledge to support technology 
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commercialization. Learning from experience can increase the chances of achieving platform 
dominance [114]. Failure to invest in learning can increase the likelihood of a platform being 
locked out of a market [88]. 
 
Factor 2: Technological performance 
When a platform group can exploit its resources better than its competitors to improve the 
technology performance of its platform, it increases its chances of market dominance [88]. For 
example operational efficiency resulting from the possession of superior production capacity can 
contribute to achieving a technological advantage for the platform, and this can increase the 
chances that their platform will achieve dominance [115]. Financial resources can also allow 
platform supporters to acquire scarce resources, increasing the platform’s technological advantage. 
They can also provide them with an advantage in terms of production quality and performance 
over their competitors.  
 
Factor 3: Supply and Demand Increasing Returns to Adoption  
Complementary products are needed to successfully commercialize platforms [111]. Their 
availability and interchangeability creates supply-side increasing returns to scale [116]. The 
existence of a wide range of complementary products and a technologically superior platform, 
requires a substantial and diverse network of stakeholders to support a platform in order to increase 
its chances of market dominance [88,109]. This is the situation EVs are facing where a network of 
battery and related equipment suppliers, grid operators and automotive companies are involved 
[117]. 
Demand side returns to scale arise from the utility an individual user derives from a platform 
as the number of its users increases [118,119]. This is influenced by the functionality of 
complementary products. The more users and possibilities for interconnection, the greater the user 
utility [83], and the higher the chance of market dominance.  
Demand side increasing returns to scale driven by consumer behaviour result in path 
dependency [23,120] which can lead to platform dominance and lock in, because of system scale 
economies, irreversibility of related investments and switching costs [121,122]. These effects 
imbue established platforms with inertia and often continuous improvements strengthen further 
their market share [123]. In the case of the automobile industry, such developments are evident in 
the improvement of internal combustion engines running on diesel or gasoline, and the slow 
diffusion of a variety of electricity-powered vehicles [124]. Finally, the availability of supporting 
infrastructure is another source of increasing returns to scale both on the supply and demand sides. 
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Factor 4: Commitment and Uncertainty in the market 
High uncertainty, about the technological, economic, and market technology potential may 
obstruct market formation and lead potential entrants away from niches [25,125]. The necessary 
initial experimentation to reduce the uncertainty about a new technology is a period of temporary 
instability for both the providers and the users [62,126]. Firms and customers may not be willing 
to take the risk of committing to one particular platform due to incomplete information and may 
delay their decision [127,128]. Another factor of uncertainty is the interpretive flexibility that 
platforms are imbued with and may result in favourable and unfavourable narratives about their 
environmental impact, job creation and boosting the economy [129].  
 
Factor 5: Rate of change and technology lifecycle 
The rate of change refers to the speed of technology and market evolution within a specific 
industry [44]. A high rate of change, affects technology lifecycles and reduces the motivation of 
users to commit to any technology [130]. The rate of change is an important factor in EVs for it 
also relates to overall energy consumption and CO2 emissions involved in developing and 
maintaining the required infrastructure [51]. 
These five factors, drawn from theory, are needed to develop a better understanding of 
platform competition. In the next section these factors are incorporated into a simulation model. 
The resultant model explores the effect of different factors on platform adoption.  
 
3. Model Development 
In this section I present a model which extends the model of  Loch and Huberman [67] (LH 
hereafter). The LH model adopts an evolutionary approach of technology competition with 
boundedly rational firms i.e. they are utility driven but are unable to optimize. Firms evaluate the 
performance of an established platform A against a single new technology B, without being 
capable of evaluating perfectly its performance or anticipating which one will dominate the 
market. Finally, the performance of incumbent and new competing platforms improves 
endogenously in the model through learning and adoption processes.  
The original LH model is extended by introducing: (i) continuous, incremental increase in 
the performance limit of established and new technologies, (ii) a range of new technology 
platforms, and (iii) three geographical regions (niches) with varying favourable conditions for 
different candidate technologies.  
The core logic of the model is presented with a causal loop diagram (Figure 1) [50].The 
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extended model describes a population of N firms that choose between an established platform A 
and a number of new ones i (where i={1…5}). The number of technologies is used as a proxy for 
technology diversity. The plus sign indicates that a factor has a reinforcing effect on another, ceteris 
paribus, and the minus sign indicates a countering effect. Each firm chooses repeatedly whether to 
stay with A or switch to i based on evaluation of technology performance Total_Performance_Gi, 
and expectations about how it will evolve in the future. The External_Benefits arising from the 
network of adopters and learning by using effects, raise the level of its Basic_Performance_Pi. 
Initially, it is assumed that there are no switching costs between the platforms. It is assumed that 
the magnitude of external benefits aggregates all increasing returns to scale. 
 
Insert Figure 1 here 
 
All firms evaluate performance in the same way and choose platforms based on 
Total_Performance_Gi. iG  is subject to two influences. First, all platforms enjoy some 
External_Benefits [131,132]. External_Benefits aggregate increasing returns to scale 
complementarities and network effects discussed in section 2.3. They are assumed to vary with the 
market share /i if n N of firms using platform i. This confers a technology specific external 
benefit 
ib  for the users of platform i (Figure 1).  
Second, firms face some uncertainty in making a technology choice which may distort its 
true value (Evaluation_Uncertainty_in_Performance_i). Firms can equally over- or under-
estimate the actual Total_Performance_Gi of candidate platforms. Uncertainty in their evaluation 
is modelled with a random component ξi that has a symmetric exponential distribution with zero 
mean and variance 1/β2 and just as in the original LH model, its density given by: 
1
( )
2
x
i x e
   for 0x      (1) 
1
( )
2
x
i x e
  for 0x        (2) 
 
Each firm evaluates the platforms separately and independently, so the random components ξi 
across firms are independent and identically distributed random variables. Each user firm evaluates 
the performance of established platform ( )AG t against new platform ( )iG t . Following Arthur [23] 
( )G t is the sum of the basic technology performance ( )iP t  and the additional external benefit bi 
from every additional user of the same technology which is proportional to market share f. 
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  ( ) ( ) ( )A A A AG t P t f t b   and ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )i i i i iG t P t f t b x    (3) 
 
Hence, while the performance PA(t) of established technology A is initially superior to its 
competitor i, firms are willing to experiment with new technology i [62]. The performance of new 
technology Pi(t) increases with use, even if firms eventually revert back to the established 
technology A. The uncertainty about new technology performance diminishes as knowledge about 
its use accumulates and it approaches its performance limit. It is assumed that uncertainty 
diminishes when market share increases, and information about the availability of future product 
versions, upgrades, complementary products and services is provided in the market [133]. This 
effect has been modelled in uncertainty parameter β: 
( ) (1 ( ))O it f t      (4) 
where fi is the market share of the new technology and βο the initial technology performance 
uncertainty. ( )iG t  changes due to external benefits and incremental technology improvements in 
basic performance Pi.  
 
Technology Performance 
In the LH model there is a fixed technology performance ceiling for both established and 
new technologies that cannot be surpassed. The first extension to the model concerns this 
assumption that is not so realistic for two reasons. First, all technologies grow or diminish in size 
with time with corresponding improvements in functionality [134,135]. The technology 
improvement limits are a reflection of unit scale technology limits [136]. In the case of EVs, 
upscaling can involve high current capacity for fast recharging, smaller batteries, or additional 
functionality i.e. bidirectional transfer of electricity and information between the grid and the car. 
Second, incumbent firms act through several ways to deter the entry of other firms in 
industries. A technology performance ceiling constitutes part of the environmental dynamics and 
barriers a new entrant has to face and this is not static otherwise a lot more entrants would succeed 
[137,138]. For example, in the case of passenger vehicles, automotive firms in UK and Germany 
have announced that they do want to develop electric vehicles in the long term, but their short-
term CO2 reduction strategies will aim on optimizing ICE vehicles [4].  
These two reasons motivate an extension to the original LH model. The extended model 
removes the assumption of fixed technology performance ceiling by letting it increase indefinitely 
in time albeit with increasing levels of difficulty [139]. It is assumed that the difficulty D in 
technology performance improvement is directly related to solving the ensuing problems of the 
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technology and that it progressively increases with the number of problems solved [44]. The 
difficulty Di(t) in raising the performance ceiling ( )iP t  of technology i rises with the level of its 
current value according to: 
( ) ( ( ) / )i i iD t P t C
  (4) 
( ) 1 ( )i iP t D t dt    (5) 
Equations are motivated by analogy to the way the problem solving difficulty of scientific 
paradigms rises with the total number of problems solved [140]. Ci is the intrinsic development 
capability of each technology which depends on infrastructure, R&D capacity and existing 
knowledge, human resources and regulation. The exponent γ influences the rate at which difficulty 
Di rises with cumulative technology development. It is assumed that A and i technologies do not 
differ in these respects and parameters C and γ are assigned same values for them.  
The improvement rate of the basic technology performance iP  depends on three factors: (i) 
the market share fi of current user firms since a larger market share encourages improvement efforts 
and learning by doing (their learning capability is assumed to be exogenous), (ii) the current 
technology performance iP  as increasing knowledge about the technology opens up additional 
improvement opportunities, and (iii) the amount of performance improvement that is currently 
possible, which is related to the technology's inherent performance ceiling iP . The level of 
accumulated basic performance increases with the learning rate ci of each technology which 
represents the competence of its developers and complexity, and the market share fi of technology 
i according to:  
( ( ) ( ))
( ) { ( ) ( ) ( ) }
( )
i i
i i i i i
i
P t P t
P t P t c f t P t dt
P t

    (6) 
 
Identical values for c and initial P(t) are used for technologies A and i. The adoption speed for a 
candidate technology i depends on user expectations E about how the Total_Performance_ ( )iG t
will evolve in the future:  
 
 ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
i i
i i i F
i P
G t G t
E G t G t T
G t T

  

  (7) 
Where TP is the time window of past technology performance improvements that users consider 
and TF is the future time about which expectations are formed. Expectations are formed based on 
the rate of technology learning and externalities. The core structure of the extended system 
dynamics model is shown below in Figure 2. Equations are listed in Appendix A. 
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Insert Figure 2 here 
 
Testing and Validation 
A fundamental validation test was to reproduce the original LH model and its results (Figures 
3, 4 and 5 in the original publication), since the exact code and numerical set up of their model 
was not available1. Tests confirmed that system resistance to switching between different states 
increases: (i) with the size N of the adopter firm population, (ii) if the external benefits to adopters 
are small or heterogeneous, (iii) with the initial performance difference between established and 
competing platforms, (iv) if the uncertainty in evaluating the performance of the new technology 
i is low and thus few adopters try it out, and (v) user expectations.  
An exploration of the factors cited in the LH model with the present model confirms their 
conclusion that when system resistance to change is low, technology i may be adopted without its 
performance exceeding that of A, provided that the latter's learning rate is slow. The converse is 
also confirmed, that technology i may be adopted after its performance has exceeded the 
performance of A because of its positive externalities. This is possible if the learning rate for 
technology i is fast and the system's resistance is high, which a realistic transition scenario.  
In addition, the extended model was tested to check its validity [50].Testing with zero network 
effects for the new platforms shows it is possible for a new platform to become dominant because 
learning by using still allows performance improvements and hence improved competitiveness. 
However, with zero learning by using, this is not possible. Other tests included dimensional 
consistency, extreme conditions where high or low values are assigned to input parameters, 
numerical sensitivity to simulation time step, and testing for high and low values of technology 
uncertainty [50].  
 
4. Results 
The aim of the paper was to explore how the number of competing platforms and the variety 
of niche conditions can potentially delay scaling up processes. For this, five versions of the model 
were created. For version 1 i=1, for 2 i=2 and so on. In each version there are three niches where 
competing platforms develop. This is design allows for testing the effect of number of platforms 
and spatial differentiation on transition time. Six setups were tested, representing an increasing 
differentiation of external benefits magnitude that platforms face in three niches (Table 1). 
Platform lifecycle was varied from 5 to 30 years (5yr step) and initial uncertainty βo from 5 to 8 
                                                 
1 The authors were contacted but it was not possible to retrieve their original program code. 
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(step of 1). Simulation horizon was set to 100 years with a time step of 0.25 years. Each set up was 
simulated 100 times resulting in a total of 48000 runs.  
 
Insert Table 1 Here 
 
The following sections present simulation results concerning the effect of technology lifecycle, 
number of technologies and initial uncertainty βο. The final section presents results concerning 
spatial differentiation between niches of the environment that technologies face.  
 
Exploration of Technology Lifecycle and Initial Uncertainty βο 
Figure 3 shows simulation results for set up 1 to 6 (x-axis), for the five model versions with 
i=1-5 (y-axis), with βo =5 for A, and two technology lifecycles: 5yr and 30yr. A transition to a new 
platform takes less time on average (red area) with a larger number of competing platforms and 
with strong external benefits (Figure 3, left). Longer lifecycles result in an increase in minimum 
and maximum time to transition (Figure 3, right). A striking difference exists between platforms 
with 5yr where having 3-4 technologies reduces transition time, and longer lifecycles (30yr) where 
having more than one or two competing platforms significantly increases the transition time. 
Higher external benefits perform better in all cases. Results with double the external benefits step 
in niches 1 and 2 (Table 1) produce qualitatively similar results in every case.  
 
Insert Figure 3 Here 
 
Since the model is stochastic the set up in Table 1 was simulated for βo values ranging from 5 to 
8. Simulations with values lower than 5 result in a permanent lock-in of the established platform 
A, and higher than 8 dilute any advantage a platform might have and result in perpetual 
competition. Figure 4 shows results with 5yr lifecycle and βo =6 and 8 (plot with βo = 7 is quite 
similar to βo = 8 and βo =5 is shown in Figure 3). Results show that favourable conditions 
(increased external benefits) along with uncertainty lead to lower time for platform substitution. 
The range of setups over which the minimum transition occurs is increased (bright red area) 
compared to Figure 3. 
There are two dynamics playing out here. The increase in uncertainty results in candidate 
platforms i being selected more often. This kick starts the reinforcing dynamics that improve their 
Total_Performance_ ( )iG t  (Figure 1). At the same time increased initial uncertainty in evaluating 
technology performance obscures the best performing candidate technology and keeps it from 
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achieving rapid diffusion, particularly with low external benefits (blue-green area). Thus there is 
a trade-off between minimum time to technology substitution, maintaining a large number of 
platforms with uncertain performance, and external benefits.  
 
Insert Figure 4 here 
 
The same tests were performed with 10yr, 20yr and 30yr lifecycles. Figure 5 presents results with 
a 20yr lifecycle and βo =5 and 8. The increase in initial uncertainty decreases the minimum time 
to platform substitution (red area) but it also increases the range of conditions over which platform 
substitution takes a long time (blue area in Figure 5, right). Results with a 10 and 30yr lifecycle 
are qualitatively identical and the range of time values is very close to the 20yr setting. The 
behaviour of the model is qualitatively the same for higher uncertainty values irrespective of 
lifecycle values.  
 
Insert Figure 5 Here 
 
The conclusion from Figures 3, 4, 5 is that: there is a trade-off between the objective of achieving 
a low transition time and allowing the maximum range of technology options in order to avoid an 
early system lock-in to an inferior option. The results also highlight the effect that technology 
lifecycle can have. With low uncertainty and 5yr lifecycle (Figure 4) a higher number of competing 
technologies produces a lower transition time than the case of longer lifecycles (Figure 5). Results 
offer the counterintuitive insight that with high initial uncertainty a lower number of candidate 
technologies is required, whereas with less initial uncertainty a higher number of technologies is 
desirable. This makes sense as low uncertainty allows the best performing technologies to stand 
out in the market relatively fast and scale up so, it allows exploration of a larger range of 
technologies. With high uncertainty, the time it takes for technology performance improvements 
to make a difference in market selection is longer. In contrast, conventional wisdom goes the other 
way around i.e. starting with many candidate technologies when there is uncertainty and then 
progressively as uncertainty is reduced, reduce the range of technologies [20]. 
The results justify the idea that there may be too many or too few competing technologies for 
achieving a balance between technological variety and scaling up and bringing about system wide 
change. If many niches are established, potential economies of scale are lost and reduce the total 
potential for major innovations and taking advantage of a larger market [141]. At the same time 
an excessive number of niches should be avoided particularly with highly uncertain platforms.  
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Lifecycle Effects 
An underlying assumption in the investigation so far is that the established and the candidate 
platforms have identical lifecycles. In reality niches for platform experimentation may be set up 
locally with a very short time horizon. Figure 6 shows candidate platform lifecycle versus the 
average time it takes to substitute an established platform with a lifecycle of 30yr. The greater the 
lifecycle, the shorter the time it takes for platform substitution, irrespective of the level of initial 
uncertainty. These results confirm the importance of long-term commitment to niche experiments.  
 
Insert Figure 6 Here 
 
Spatial Differentiation 
Increasing the realism of the model, it is plausible to assume that some niches will be more 
conducive to specific technologies adoption. They may offer particular institutional advantages, 
pertinent to a geographical region i.e. passive niche protection [11]. Three niche configurations 
are explored to see whether spatial differentiation makes a difference.  
Configuration (i) with identical external benefits across niches resulting from policies aiming 
to create a “level playing field” for all competing platforms [142] (Van den Bergh et la., 2006). 
Configuration (ii) with external benefits aligned in favour of one platform across niches. For 
example, the diffusion of alternative fuel vehicles (AFV) faces a “chicken-and-egg” problem: 
potential users wait for fuelling infrastructure to be put in place, and fuel providers and vehicle 
manufacturers will not invest in infrastructure until a critical mass of AFV users is achieved 
[57,143,144].  
However, the “chicken-and-egg” problem does not apply equally to all AFVs. More than 
half of US households can charge vehicles at home [145], so there is already infrastructure in place. 
Thus, BEVs and plug-in hybrids have an advantage across AFV niches in rural or suburban niches 
where homes have personal garages. Configuration (ii) may also apply in urban areas where car 
sharing schemes can utilize public access charging points or designated on-street parking, making 
charging accessible where home charging is impossible. In contrast, provision of dedicated 
refuelling infrastructure for hydrogen fuel cell vehicles appears to be essential [53,146]. 
Configuration (iii) represents a situation where external benefits vary for different platforms 
across niches. All AFVs complement each other in the transition towards low emission vehicles. 
BEV, PHEV, and fuel cell vehicles (FCV) are all beneﬁtting from advances in electric drive 
technology (batteries, electric engines, control systems etc.) as well as from policies for electric 
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mobility, related infrastructure, low emissions standards, and higher oil prices. The differentiating 
factors between them result from targeted policies that aim to develop platforms for specific niches 
and/or a combination of passive shielding arising from the local characteristics of the niches.  
The high population density in urban areas allows high capacity utilization of transport 
infrastructure, and increases cost attractiveness of investments in public transport BEV [147]. 
However, in suburban areas the implementation of mass transit systems is more expensive [148]. 
Thus, from a cost point of view, BEVs seem to be better suited to vehicle ﬂeets (taxis, postal 
delivery, city distribution, organised car sharing) and PHEV and FCV more used by individual 
consumers and car rental companies driving longer distances [29].  
There is also spatial variability in the social benefits that AFVs produce which would 
reinforce the need for targeted favourable institutional conditions for one type of vehicle over 
others. Factors driving such differentiation include [149]: (i) the efﬁciency, emissions, and 
accessibility of the electric grid used for vehicle charging,  (ii) the location and amount of vehicle 
miles travelled with BEV or PHEV that displaces miles travelled with gasoline, and (iii) the mix 
of electricity production used in a region [5,35]. Since vehicle emissions tend to occur closer to 
urban areas compared to electric power plant emissions, there are signiﬁcant social beneﬁts of 
BEV and PHEV use in niches aiming to relieve trafﬁc-congested metropolitan areas. 
Three possible comparisons are possible between configurations (i) and (ii), (i) and (iii), (ii) 
and (iii). The difference between (i) and (ii) was explored by differentiating the external benefits 
for the candidate technologies and comparing with the standard case of uniform external benefits 
(Table 2). A lifecycle of 30yr for technologies A and i was used and each set up was simulated 100 
times. Each was tested with initial uncertainty βο=5-8, with i=2-5 candidate technologies resulting 
in total of 58000 runs for 3 configuration comparisons. Initial testing indicated that 100 runs were 
not sufficient for statistical testing purposes and all of the tests were repeated with 200 and 300 
runs. Results using 300 runs are shown in Tables 1, 2, 3, 4 (Appendix B). 
 
Insert Table 2 Here 
 
Results show that there is a statistically significant difference (t-test) between configurations (i) 
and (ii) (Table 1 in Appendix B). Technology substitution takes more time in settings where some 
geographic locales are less conducive to niche take off, compared to a case where candidate 
technologies develop under uniform and strong favourable conditions. These results show that 
support for one technology through policy i.e. picking early winners or support arising out passive 
protection because some niches are naturally more conducive to the development of certain 
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platforms, is less effective than providing the same high level of support to all platforms across all 
niches.  
In order to compare configurations (i) and (iii), configuration (ii) in Table 2 was modified so 
that external benefits favoured a different platform in each of the three niches i.e. platform 1 in 
niche 1, platform 2 in 2 and so on. In the case of two candidate platforms the model was set up 
with two niches instead of three. The simulation results were compared with t-tests and results 
show a significant difference in time (Table 2 in Appendix B). The difference in the performance 
of candidate platforms brought about by varying external benefits does not result in the required 
rate of improvement for any of them. In a sense in configuration (iii) the established platform A 
“sails away” for more time.  
Finally, a comparison is made between configurations (ii) and (iii). The results show no 
statistically significant difference between them. Both though have significant differences with 
respect to configuration (i) where policies create a level playing field for all candidate platforms 
and this results in a quicker transition to new platforms.  
The complementary case was also explored, where a uniform configuration was tested 
against differentiated ones with higher magnitude external benefits. The aim was to see whether it 
is better to have higher external benefits even if this means that there is an uneven support for 
technologies in different niches in situations where policies cannot be used to create a level playing 
field. Table 2 was modified as shown in Table 3. 
 
Insert Table 3 Here 
 
A similar series of t-tests produced the results summarised in Table 3 (Appendix B) which show 
that there is a statistically significant difference between configurations (i) and (v) i.e. it is better 
to provide increased support even for some technologies rather than providing a low level of 
support for all technologies.  
Configuration (v) is altered to create configuration (vi) in order to reflect the same spatial 
differentiation with respect to external benefits as configuration (iii). This is again compared to 
configuration (i) and results again show that there is a statistically significant difference between 
the two configurations (Table 4 in Appendix B).  
In summary, Tables 3, 4, 6 and 7 indicate that: 
 Transition time is longer in the case where one niche technology enjoys externality 
benefits of high magnitude and others less so, versus a case where externality benefits are 
of equally high magnitude across all technologies (Figure 7, top). 
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 Transition time is longer in the case where all niche technologies enjoy externality 
benefits of equal magnitude, versus a case where one of them enjoys substantially higher 
externality benefits (Figure 7, bottom). 
 
Insert Figure 7 Here 
 
5. Discussion  
Results show that the number of competing technologies, the conditions resulting from 
geographically bound institutional advantages and/or policies, the uncertainty in technology 
performance evaluation and the technology lifecycle make a difference. Transition time increases 
with a large number of competing technologies and it is even longer when they are spatially 
dispersed in places that favour different technologies. Results offer the counterintuitive insight that 
with high initial uncertainty a lower number of candidate technologies is required than a case of 
less uncertainty where a wider range of technologies is desirable. Conventional wisdom goes the 
other way around i.e. starting with many candidate technologies and then progressively as 
uncertainty is reduced, the range of technologies is reduced. 
Simulation results show that there is a trade-off between high initial uncertainty, maintaining 
a large initial number of competing platforms and reducing transition time. While increased initial 
uncertainty (βo values) reduces the time to technology substitution overall, the minimum time in 
most cases is not achieved by having the maximum number of platforms compete. As technology 
matures and related uncertainty is inevitably reduced, high technological variety becomes 
counterproductive to technology substitution and thus adds inertia to systems that need technology 
change towards low carbon trajectories.  
Results also show that if established and candidate platforms have different lifecycles e.g 30yr 
and 10yr, then the latter have substantially lower chances of becoming adopted. Small lifecycles 
result in frequent switching between technologies something that prevents commitment to one, 
and the earlier emergence of those with higher performance. Commitment to candidate platforms 
must be maintained for as long as those intended to replace. This will set in motion the self-
reinforcing processes required for candidate platforms with the capacity to significantly impact the 
system. 
The insights regarding spatial differentiation confirm that local context is important and 
should be taken into consideration in all future transition modelling and simulation work as 
different niches provide different opportunities for technology development. Ideally, a level 
competitive field should be created where all technologies receive equally strong support, 
accounting for their spatial dispersion and the varying institutional advantages it confers. However, 
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it is unlikely that this will be possible everywhere, hence technology development and platform 
replacement will take longer.  
The results point to some implications for firms and technology policy and future research 
directions. First, maintaining a diverse portfolio of technology options is important. Supporting 
early winners may result in a faster transition but can also lock in the system into an inferior 
solution. Prolonged periods of market competition inevitably delay the transition to a new system 
state. Second, incumbent and candidate technologies were conceptualized as competing in the 
model. However, collaboration in the automotive sector and elsewhere is also possible and is worth 
exploring [150]. For example, direct involvement of incumbent firms through policies for 
exploring use of hybrid vehicles in public transport niches seems inevitable due to the nature of 
these capital goods. An interesting research direction, given the technological and institutional 
diversity, is what is the appropriate policy mix for avoiding excessive inertia. When should 
competition and when should collaboration be facilitated and incentivized? A concomitant issue 
relates to the fact that in most cases a series of new technologies is introduced in niches gradually 
rather than simultaneously as in the model. Thus, future research could explore how should the 
policy mix be adapted in time to account for this. 
Third, the non-emergence of a single dominant platform may not be detrimental to the 
potential for transitions. A variety of platforms can disrupt different parts of the system in a 
decentralized way and cumulatively make it crumble rather than having a dominant new platform. 
This is also an issue for future research for example in the transport system with a mix of 
substitutes for ICE cars, each perhaps starting with different initial uncertainty.  
Finally, another issue for future work is the role of the technology ceiling. Cursory simulation 
runs indicate that the rate at which R&D raises the technology ceiling both for the established and 
the candidate platforms matters for the time to technology substitution. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper investigated the dilemma of developing and maintaining a diverse range of 
technologies versus the need for rapid scale up in order to reduce the time it takes to have a wide 
impact on present day carbon intensive systems. Technological diversity keeps options open and 
allows for spillovers, but may also mean foregoing returns to scale thus delaying transitions that 
are urgently needed. This dilemma has a technological and a concomitant spatial element, as 
different geographical locales may favour the development of different technologies.  
A model of multiple technologies competing with an established system technology was 
developed to explore whether the required time to transition diminishes with a larger number of 
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platform technologies, and whether time diminishes when different platforms are favoured in 
different geographical locales. The evolutionary system dynamics model developed in this paper 
extents prior work [67] in three ways: (i) it allows for a range of competing technologies rather 
than just one, (ii) it integrates spatial differentiation and associated unique conditions, and (iii) it 
includes dynamic performance ceilings for competing technologies to account for learning. 
Results indicate that maintaining a particular degree of technological diversity is desirable 
but there is a threshold beyond which diversity will adversely affect technology market scale. 
Ideally all technologies should face an equally favourable context so that the best will emerge 
through selection processes. Nevertheless, the spatial variation arising from specific climatic, 
industrial, knowledge, population density conditions provides opportunities for simultaneously 
developing returns to scale and reaping some diversity beneﬁts. 
The present work highlights the importance of considering the level of technological 
diversity in designing policy along with other relevant criteria of efficiency, sustainability, energy 
security, and affordability. Diversity affects the effectiveness of policies as well as their robustness 
against the inherent uncertainty about technological and market developments. The take away 
message though is that more diversity is not always better. It may also the case that diversity may 
need to be actively managed temporally. Policy makers could try to coordinate the specialization 
of particular geographical areas to speciﬁc technologies and direct them to attain appropriate scale 
in order that technologies receive increased external benefits. This would potentially reduce the 
tension between benefits arising from diversity and increasing returns to scale.  
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Appendix A Equation List 
Name Unit Definition Value 
Basic Tech Perf P1 - 5   'Initial Tech Perf P1' 1 
Basic Tech Perf Pi - 5   'Initial Tech Perf Pi' {0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5} 
Ceiling i Increase - 5 yr^-1 1/'Difficulty in further increase - 5'/1<<yr>>*'Switch Tech i Ceiling'   
Ceiling of Technology 1 - 5   'Initial Technology 1 Ceiling - 5' 5 
Ceiling of Technology i - 5   'Initial Technology i Ceiling - 5' {5, 5, 5, 5, 5} 
Ceilinhg 1 Increase - 5 yr^-1 1/'Difficulty in further increase 1 - 5'/1<<yr>>*'Switch Tech 1 Ceiling'   
Denominator C i   0.01 0.01 
Denominator C i - 5   {0.01,0.01,0.01,0.01,0.01}  
{0.01, 0.01, 0.01, 0.01, 
0.01} 
Denominator C1   0.01 0.01 
Denominator C1 - 5   0.01 0.01 
Difficulty in further increase - 5   ('Ceiling of Technology i - 5'/'Denominator C i - 5')^'Exponent i - 5'    
Difficulty in further increase 1 - 5   ('Ceiling of Technology 1 - 5'/'Denominator C1 - 5')^'Exponent 1 - 5'    
Early Adopters - 5   1 1 
Early Adoption Rate - 5 yr^-1 LOOKUP('Priority Allocation - 5',1)/1<<yr>>    
Early Firms in Technology i - 5   {10,0,0,0,0,0} //index 1 is old technology {10, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0} 
Early Return Rate - 5 yr^-1 'Early Firms in Technology i - 5'/FOR (i=1..6|'Tech Adoption Decision Lifecycle'[INDEX(i)])    
Evaluation Random Component xhiPt1 - 
5 
  'xhi Exp random - 5'+('Ceiling of Technology i - 5'-'Basic Tech Perf Pi - 5')/'Ceiling of Technology i - 5'    
Exponent 1 - 5   1 1 
Exponent i   0.7 0.7 
Exponent i - 5   'Exponent i'  {0.7, 0.7, 0.7, 0.7, 0.7} 
External Benefit b1   1 1 
External Benefit Input   'External Benefit Range'[INDEX('RUN INDEX External Benefits')]    
External Benefit Range   
XLDATA("C:/Users/GP/Desktop/Future Work/MS a punctuated equilibrium model of technology diffusion/models 
arrayed disaggregate/./Output ALL tech.xls", "External Benefits", "R3C18:R12C20") 
  
Externality Benefit b1 - 5   1 1 
Externality Benefit bi - 5   TRANSPOSE(FOR (i=1..5|'External Benefit Input'))     
f1 fraction - 5   
('Early Firms in Technology i - 5'[INDEX(1)] +'Mainstream Firms in Technology i - 5'[INDEX(1)]+'Late Firms in 
Technology i - 5'[INDEX(1)]) /'Total N of Firms1 - 3' 
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fi fraction - 5   
FOR (i=Ntechnologies5| 'Early Firms in Technology i - 5'[INDEX(i+1)] +'Mainstream Firms in Technology i - 
5'[INDEX(i+1)]+'Late Firms in Technology i - 5'[INDEX(i+1)])/'Total N of Firms1 - 3' 
  
Firms in Technologies i5   'Early Firms in Technology i - 5'+'Mainstream Firms in Technology i - 5'+'Late Firms in Technology i - 5'   
Forecast G1 - 5   FORECAST('Total Perf G1 - 5', 'Tech Forecasting Horizon','Tech Forecasting Horizon')    
Forecast i - 5   
FOR (j='Ex Benefits', i=Ntechnologies5|FORECAST(LOOKUP('Total Performance Gi - 5',j,i), 'Tech Forecasting 
Horizon','Tech Forecasting Horizon'))  
  
Initial Tech Perf P1   1 1 
Initial Tech Perf P1 - 5   1 1 
Initial Tech Perf Pi   0.5 0.5 
Initial Tech Perf Pi - 5   {0.1,0.1,0.1,0.1,0.1}  {0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1} 
Initial Technology 1 Ceiling - 5   5 5 
Initial Technology i Ceiling - 5   {5,5,5,5,5} {5, 5, 5, 5, 5} 
Input RND x - 5   
FOR (i=Ntechnologies5|RANDOM(-1,1))*(1-'Switch Fixed RND') +FOR (i=Ntechnologies5|RANDOM(-
1,1,i*0.12))*'Switch Fixed RND'  
  
Late Adopters - 5   1 1 
Late Adoption Rate - 4 yr^-1 'Priority Allocation - Copy 2 - 4'/1<<yr>>   
Late Firms in Technology i - 5   {10,0,0,0,0,0} {10, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0} 
Late Return Rate - 5 yr^-1 'Late Firms in Technology i - 5'/FOR (i=1..6|'Tech Adoption Decision Lifecycle'[INDEX(i)])   
Learning Rate C1   1 1 
Learning Rate Ci   1 1 
Learning Rate Ci - 5   {0.1,0.1,0.1,0.1,0.1}*1  {0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1} 
Lifecycle Range   {5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30}    
Lifecycleinput   'Lifecycle Range'[INDEX('RUN INDEX Lifecycle')]    
Mainstream Adopters - 5   1 1 
Mainstream Adoptikon Rarte - 4 yr^-1 'Priority Allocation - Copy - 4'/1<<yr>>   
Mainstream Firms in Technology i - 5   {10,0,0,0,0,0} {10, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0} 
Mainstream Return Rate - 5 yr^-1 'Mainstream Firms in Technology i - 5'/FOR (i=1..6|'Tech Adoption Decision Lifecycle'[INDEX(i)])   
N RUNS External Benefits   1000 1,000 
N RUNS Lifecycle Range   100 100 
N RUNS Parameter beta   1000 1,000 
P1 Improvement Rate - 5 yr^-1 
'Learning Rate C1'*'f1 fraction - 5'*'Basic Tech Perf P1 - 5'*('Ceiling of Technology 1 - 5'-'Basic Tech Perf P1 - 
5')/'Ceiling of Technology 1 - 5' /1<<yr>> 
  
Parameter beta Input   'Parameter beta range'[INDEX('RUN INDEX Parameter  beta')]  5 
Parameter beta range   
XLDATA("C:/Users/GP/Desktop/Future Work/MS a punctuated equilibrium model of technology diffusion/models 
arrayed disaggregate/./Output ALL tech.xls", "Uncertainty Spread", "R3C5:R12C5")  
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Pi Improvement Rate - 5 yr^-1 
FOR (i=Ntechnologies5|'Learning Rate Ci'*'fi fraction - 5'[INDEX(i)]*'Basic Tech Perf Pi - 5'[INDEX(i)] *('Ceiling 
of Technology i - 5'[INDEX(i)]-'Basic Tech Perf Pi - 5'[INDEX(i)]) /'Ceiling of Technology i - 
5'[INDEX(i)])/1<<yr>> 
  
Priority Allocation - 5   
{PRIORITYALLOC('Early Adopters - 5',{'Early Adopters - 5','Early Adopters - 5','Early Adopters - 5','Early 
Adopters - 5','Early Adopters - 5','Early Adopters - 5'}, {'Forecast G1 - 5',LOOKUP('Forecast i - 5',1,1), 
LOOKUP('Forecast i - 5',1,2),LOOKUP('Forecast i - 5',1,3),LOOKUP('Forecast i - 5',1,4),LOOKUP('Forecast i - 
5',1,5)})}  
  
Priority Allocation - Copy - 4   
PRIORITYALLOC('Mainstream Adopters - 5',{'Mainstream Adopters - 5', 'Mainstream Adopters - 5','Mainstream 
Adopters - 5','Mainstream Adopters - 5','Mainstream Adopters - 5','Mainstream Adopters - 5'}, {'Forecast G1 - 
5',LOOKUP('Forecast i - 5',2,1), LOOKUP('Forecast i - 5',2,2),LOOKUP('Forecast i - 5',2,3),LOOKUP('Forecast i - 
5',2,4),LOOKUP('Forecast i - 5',2,5)})  
  
Priority Allocation - Copy 2 - 4   
PRIORITYALLOC('Late Adopters - 5',{'Late Adopters - 5', 'Late Adopters - 5','Late Adopters - 5','Late Adopters - 
5','Late Adopters - 5','Late Adopters - 5'}, {'Forecast G1 - 5',LOOKUP('Forecast i - 5',3,1), LOOKUP('Forecast i - 
5',3,2), LOOKUP('Forecast i - 5',3,3),LOOKUP('Forecast i - 5',3,4),LOOKUP('Forecast i - 5',3,5)}) 
  
RUN INDEX External Benefits   INTEGER(FLOOR((RUNINDEX- 1)/'N RUNS External Benefits') + 1) //6 1 
RUN INDEX Lifecycle   INTEGER(FLOOR((RUNINDEX- 1)/'N RUNS Lifecycle Range') + 1)  1 
RUN INDEX Parameter  beta   INTEGER(FLOOR((RUNINDEX- 1)/'N RUNS Parameter beta') + 1) 1 
Stop Condition - 5   IF (RUNMAX(ARRMAX('fi fraction - 5'))>0.5,1,0)    
Switch Fixed RND   0 0 
Switch Tech 1 Ceiling   1 1 
Switch Tech i Ceiling   1 1 
Tech Adoption Decision Lifecycle yr {30,Lifecycleinput,Lifecycleinput,Lifecycleinput,Lifecycleinput,Lifecycleinput}*1<<yr>>  {30, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5} yr 
Tech Forecasting Horizon yr 5<<yr>> 5 yr 
Time Increment - 5 yr^-1 IF ('Stop Condition - 5'>0,0,1)/1<<yr>>   
Time to Transition - 5   0 0 
Total N of Firms1 - 3   
'Early Adopters - 5'+'Mainstream Adopters - 5'+'Late Adopters - 5'+ARRSUM('Early Firms in Technology i - 5')+ 
ARRSUM('Mainstream Firms in Technology i - 5')+ ARRSUM('Late Firms in Technology i - 5') 
  
Total Perf G1 - 5   'Basic Tech Perf P1 - 5'+'f1 fraction - 5'*'Externality Benefit b1 - 5'   
Total Performance Gi - 5   
FOR (i='Ex Benefits', j=Ntechnologies5| 'Basic Tech Perf Pi - 5'[INDEX(j)]+'fi fraction - 
5'[INDEX(j)]*LOOKUP('Externality Benefit bi - 5',i,j)+'Evaluation Random Component xhiPt1 - 5'[INDEX(j)]) 
  
xhi Exp random - 5   
IF ('Input RND x - 5'>=0, 1/2*'Parameter beta Input'*EXP(-'Parameter beta Input'*'Input RND x - 5'),  
1/2*'Parameter beta Input'*EXP('Parameter beta Input'*'Input RND x - 5'))  
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Appendix B Statistical Results 
 
Table 1 Comparison of configurations (i) and (ii)  
Uncertainty set up 2 tech 3 tech 4 tech 5 tech 
βo=5 
1 P = 0.013 P = <0.001 P = <0.001 P = <0.001 
2 P = 0.006 P = <0.001 P = <0.001 P = <0.001 
3 P = 0.004 P = 0.001 P = <0.001 P = 0.005 
4 P = 0.027 P = <0.001 P = <0.001 P = <0.001 
5 P = 0.007 P = 0.021 P = <0.001 P = 0.003 
βo=6 
1 P = <0.001 P = <0.001 P = <0.001 P = <0.001 
2 P = 0.022 P = <0.001 P = <0.001 P = <0.001 
3 P = 0.033 P = <0.001 P = <0.001 P = <0.001 
4 P = 0.036 P = <0.001 P = <0.001 P = 0.003 
5 P = 0.016 P = 0.001 P = 0.047 P = 0.040 
βo=7 
1 P = 0.010 P = <0.001 P = <0.001 P = <0.001 
2 P = 0.014 P = <0.001 P = <0.001 P = <0.001 
3 P = <0.001 P = 0.002 P = <0.001 P = 0.005 
4 P = 0.002 P = <0.001 P = <0.001 P = <0.001 
5 P = <0.001 P = <0.001 P = <0.001 P = 0.004 
βo=8 
1 P = 0.024 P = <0.001 P = <0.001 P = 0.003 
2 P = 0.011 P = 0.006 P = <0.001 P = 0.001 
3 P = 0.002 P = <0.001 P = <0.001 P = <0.001 
4 P = <0.001 P = <0.001 P = <0.001 P = 0.001 
5 P = 0.002 P = <0.001 P = <0.001 P = 0.001 
 
Table 2 Comparison of configurations (i) and (iii). 
Uncertainty set up 2 tech 3 tech 4 tech 5 tech 
βo=5 
1 P = 0.013 P = <0.001 P = <0.001 P = <0.001 
2 P = <0.001 P = 0.005 P = <0.001 P = 0.030 
3 P = 0.010 P = <0.001 P = <0.001 P = <0.001 
4 P = 0.011 P = <0.001 P = <0.001 P = <0.001 
5 P = 0.011 P = 0.005 P = 0.008 P = 0.029 
βo=6 
1 P = <0.001 P = <0.001 P = <0.001 P = <0.001 
2 P = <0.001 P = <0.001 P = <0.001 P = 0.002 
3 P = 0.008 P = <0.001 P = <0.001 P = <0.001 
4 P = 0.008 P = <0.001 P = <0.001 P = 0.011 
5 P = 0.006 P = 0.020 P = <0.001 P = 0.015 
βo=7 
1 P = <0.001 P = <0.001 P = <0.001 P = <0.001 
2 P = <0.001 P = <0.001 P = <0.001 P = <0.001 
3 P = <0.001 P = <0.001 P = <0.001 P = <0.001 
4 P = 0.019 P = <0.001 P = <0.001 P = <0.001 
5 P = 0.016 P = <0.001 P = <0.001 P = <0.001 
βo=8 
1 P = <0.001 P = 0.003 P = <0.001 P = <0.001 
2 P = <0.001 P = <0.001 P = <0.001 P = <0.001 
3 P = <0.001 P = 0.012 P = <0.001 P = <0.001 
4 P = <0.001 P = 0.041 P = <0.001 P = 0.009 
5 P = 0.002 P = 0.002 P = <0.001 P = 0.031 
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Table 3 Comparison of configurations (i) and (v). 
Uncertainty set up 2 tech 3 tech 4 tech 5 tech 
βo=5 
1 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 
2 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 
3 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 
4 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=0.008 
5 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=0.027 
βo=6 
1 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 
2 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 
3 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=0.002 
4 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=0.028 
5 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=0.003 
βo=7 
1 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 
2 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 
3 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 
4 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=0.004 
5 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 
βo=8 
1 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 
2 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 
3 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 
4 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 
5 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 
 
Table 4 Comparison of configurations (i) and (vi). 
Uncertainty set up 2 tech 3 tech 4 tech 5 tech 
βo=5 
1 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 
2 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 
3 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 
4 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=0.002 
5 P=<0.001 P=0.001 P=<0.001 P=0.027 
βo=6 
1 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 
2 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 
3 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 
4 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 
5 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 
βo=7 
1 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 
2 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 
3 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 
4 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 
5 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 
βo=8 
1 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 
2 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 
3 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 
4 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 
5 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 P=<0.001 
 
